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Abstract This  paper  is  divided  in  four  parts.  In  the  first  part  we  introduce  the  method  of  internal  critique  of
philosophical  theories by examination of their external  consistency with scientific theories.  In the second part  two
metaphysical and one epistemological postulate of Wittgenstein's Tractatus are made explicit and formally expressed. In
the third part we examine whether Tractarian metaphysical and epistemological postulates (the independence of simple
states of affairs,  the unique mode of their composition, possibility of complete empirical knowledge) are externally
consistent with the theory of quantum mechanics. The result of the inquiry is negative: Tractarian postulates ought to be
be revised. Relying on the result we approach the question of the empirical character of logic in the fourth part. The
description of theoretical transformations of the notion of disjunction, in its ontological, epistemological, and logical
sense, is a common element of in all parts of the text. The conjecture on the existence of different types of disjunctive
connectives in the language of quantum mechanics concludes the paper. 
Keywords:  external  consistency,  disjunction,  logical  pluralism,  quantum  logic,  superposition,  Tractatus  logico-
philosophicus
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External consistency as an internal critique of philosophy 
It is a well-known fact that quantum theory posses numerous challenges to philosophy. Weizsäcker
(2007)  uses a metaphor in which the dialogue between physics and philosophy is compared to a
trial.  With  the  advent  of  quantum  mechanics  the  roles  in  the  trial  have  changed.1 Traditional
philosophy ceases  to be the judge and is put in the defendant's chair instead, while the former
defendant,  physics,  now becomes  the  witness.   Weizsäcker's  metaphor  emphasizes  the changed
expectations  about  what  contemporary  philosophy should do.  The common ground is  lost  and,
consequently, the philosophical critique is replaced by a need for dialogue between philosophy and
science. Weizsäcker's metaphor implies that there is no external position of certainty to be found in
philosophy but  rather  its  postulates  of  logic,  metaphysics  and epistemology  − as  conditions  of
possibility  of  scientific  knowledge  − ought  to  be  (re)constructed  in  continuous  dialogue  with
science. 
The four presuppositions of philosophical tradition embedded in Tractatus 
According to our reading, Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus ([1921] 1974), which in his
own  words  is  a  "critique  of  language'',  exemplifies  the  transcendental  type  of  critique:  the
conditions  of  possibility  of  scientific  knowledge  are  delineated  from  a  philosophical  position
external to science. The core of Tractarian theory is depicted in Figure 1. 
The world Natural science
↓ divides into ↓ consists of
Fact True proposition
↓ is composed of ↓ is composed of
Atomic fact Elementary proposition
↓ consists of ↓ consist of
Relation and objects Predicate and names
← Picture relation →
Figure 1: Tractarian theory.
Wittgenstein's  theory  exposed  in  Tractatus  logico-philosophicus is  beautiful  in  its  apparent
simplicity and closeness to the common-sense. Some of its main postulates are listed below and the
ones that will be discussed here are marked with an asterisk.
– Ontological postulates: The world is that which is the case. The world divides into facts. A
fact is an existent state of affairs. (*) States of affairs are mutually independent.2  (*) States
of affairs can be combined only in a "conjunctive way''.
– Epistemological postulates: A simple sentence is true iff it is a picture of (iff it represents)
1 Weizsäcker writes: "It is understandable that quantum theory provoked a debate over its interpretation. Not only is
it incompatible with the world view of classical physics, but also with certain positions of classical metaphysics.
[...] one must decide whether to consider this incompatibility as philosophical progress or a weakness of the theory.
The  present  book  is  based  on  the  conviction  that  we  are  dealing  with  fundamental  philosophical  progress.
According  to  this  conviction,  it  is  not  quantum theory  that  must  defend  itself  before  the  court  of  traditional
philosophies but those philosophies themselves must stand trial - in itself a philosophical process - with quantum
theory in the witness stand'' (Weizsäcker, 2007: 243).
2 Tractatus ([1921] 1974): "2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer
the existence or non-existence of another."
an existing fact. (*) It is possible to obtain a complete description of reality.
– Logical  postulates:  The meaning of a sentence is  defined by its  truth-conditions.  (*) A
complex sentence is a truth-function of its constituent parts.
In  the  next  section  postulates  marked   with  an  asterisk  will  be  examined  for  their  external
consistency with quantum mechanics.  In line with Weizsäcker's metaphor of the trial process, we
will consider quantum mechanics to be the witness, that is, a theory to which the Tractarian theory
ought to be adapted and not vice versa. This method can be understood as a kind of internal (or
deconstructive) critique of philosophy by exposing an external inconsistency of one of its most
influential theories. 
We will confront the Tractarian postulates with the notion of quantum superposition as admitted by
quantum mechanics. A brief exposition of the notion is given below.
The mathematical representation of an initial quantum state uses a symbol such as |ϕ ⟩ , and
an  expansion  (summed  list)  over  a  series  of  final  quantum  states  as  follows:
|ϕ ⟩=a1|A ⟩+a2|B ⟩+a3|C ⟩+ ... The amplitudes are a collection of complex numbers related
to the probability that the initial state |ϕ ⟩ will change into one of  |n ⟩  final states as the
result of a measurement. (Allday, 2009: 70)
Quantum states  can  be  formed by  combining  other  states  in  quantum superposition.  These
combinations can be formed from states that would, classically, be impossible simultaneously.
(Allday, 2009: 539)
The quotes contain the following presuppositions: there is a representation relation between the
language of mathematical formulas and quantum states;  superposition is admitted by the theory
although it is a "classically impossible" type of combination of simpler states into complex ones.
Examination of external consistency as a Socratic method
There are methods of science and there are methods of philosophy.  Let us call  the method of
building  a  theory  through  dialogue  the  "Socratic  method'.  This  method  requires  at  least  two
interlocutors, one of which is a philosopher while the other is an expert in the field that is relevant
for the philosophical  question under investigation.  It is  well  known that  many questions are of
common interest both for the scientist and the philosopher. For example, the theories of time and
space are presupposed by any empirical theory and yet it was physics that first made explicit the
theory of time and space. So, if a philosopher wants to investigate the questions of time and space
using the Socratic method, then a physicist is needed for the dialogue to take place.  A theory ought
to be consistent is the first requirement to which theory building is subordinated. The consistency of
a theory ought to be proved  is a closely related requirement and it shows that logical research is
necessary part of any theory building. Somewhat less known requirement is: A theory ought to be
externally  consistent or,  equivalently,  The  union  of  theories  ought  to  be  consistent.3 When  a
philosophical theory is confronted with a scientific theory and examined for its external consistency,
then a variant of Socratic method is at work and a dialogue between philosophy and science takes
place.
Suppose a philosophical theory is confronted with a scientific theory and external inconsistency has
been discovered. Then a revision must take place. Typically, the revision will involve a contraction
whereby some of old postulates will be abandoned, and an expansion in which some new ones will
be introduced. Like in any revision, the learning occurs and probably to the benefit of both sides.
3 The notion of external consistency has been introduced by Bunge (1998).
The gain for philosophy is an acquisition of a new theory, superior to the old one with respect to
external consistency. The gain for the science is that its philosophical presuppositions will become
explicit  and  thus  the  implicit  general  knowledge  (which  is  active  in  public  communication,
technical application of science and science education) can be revised and improved.
Tractarian postulates 
In  this  section  a  formalization  for  Tractarian  picture-relation  will  be  proposed  and  used  in
formulation of the independence postulate in metaphysics. 
Independence postulate 
Definition  1 W={s1,s2, ... , sn} is  the  set  of  all  possible  simple  states  of  affairs.
el(L)={p1, p2, ... , pn}   is the set of elementary propositions of the language L .
Postulate 1 Any w⊆W  is a world.
Definition 2  Picture relation P   is a one-to-one relation between the set of atomic propositions
and the set of all possible states of affairs. Formally, P  is a relation such that conditions (1)-(4)
hold.
el(L)={x :∃ y xPy } (1)
W={y :∃ x xPy } (2)
∀ x∀ y∀ z (( xPz∧ yPz)→ x= y ) (3)
∀ x∀ y∀ z (( xPy∧xPz)→ y=z ) (4)
Each simple state of affairs is pictured by exactly one elementary proposition and, conversely, each 
elementary proposition pictures exactly one simple state of affairs.
Definition 3  Reality is the function real :el( L)×2W→{true , false }   which determines the truth-
value  of each elementary proposition p∈el(L) in any world w∈2W : real (p ,w)=true if
pPs for some s∈w , and real (p ,w)=false otherwise.
An immediate consequence of Postulate 1 is Theorem 1 on absence of mutually exclusive simple
states of affairs. 
Theorem 1  No simple state of affairs excludes no simple state of affairs. 
Proof. Suppose that states of affairs s1  and s2 are mutually exclusive. Then no world contains
both state of affairs s1  and state of affairs s2 . This is not possible since any subset of W  is
a world and so {s1, s2 }  is a world.  
Unique mode of composition of states of affairs into complexes 
Although there is no explicit statement in Tractatus on how states of affairs can be combined, it is at
least  consistent  to  assume that  Tractatus metaphysics  accepts  the  principle  of  unique  mode of
composition of states of affairs into complex facts. Explicit formulations of the principle on the
unique mode of composition can be found in the literature.  E.g.,  philosopher Armstrong (1997)
accepts conjunctive mode and rejects negative and disjunctive modes of composition of states of
affairs: 
We require [...] a distinction between atomic and molecular states of affairs. Because negative
and disjunctive states of affairs will be rejected, molecular states of affairs are all of them mere
conjunctions of atomic states of affairs. (Armstrong, 1997: 241) 
Postulate 2 The unique mode of composition of states of affairs is the conjunctive mode.
The mereology of complete knowledge 
The third postulate concerns language and ascribes unlimited expressive power to it. 
Postulate 3  The complete description of reality is possible.
The notion of complete description corresponds to the notion of reality. Complete description of a
world  w can be equated with a set of elementary propositions and their negations, i.e. with a
subset of literals of L .
Definition 4  A complete description d (w) of a world w is the smallest set of literals such that
p∈d (w)  if pPs  for some s∈w and ¬p∈d (w) otherwise.
Complete description is consistent since it cannot contain both an atom and its negation. Complete
description determines the truth-value of any proposition. Symbolically, for any sentence ϕ∈L
it holds that either  ϕ∈Cn(d (w)) or  ¬ϕ∈Cn(d (w)) , where  Cn(d (w )) denotes the set of
logical consequences of  d (w) .  Any complete description  d (w)  is a minimal set,  that is,
there is no proper subset of it which is complete. 
Remark 2 It should be noted that if a complete description d (w) contains a disjunction, it also
contains at least one of its disjuncts. The proof for this well-known  fact will be omitted here.
One can safely assume that the implicit Tractarian linguistic postulate on the possibility of complete
description is a necessary condition for the tacit  Tractarian epistemic postulate on possibility of
complete knowledge. If the world described by the complete description is the real one, then its
complete description is called "natural science''. The relevant Tractarian thesis is: 
4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the
natural sciences).
(Wittgenstein [1921] 1974)
The tacit Tractarian epistemic thesis is made explicit in Postulate 4. 
Postulate 4 The complete description of the world can become known.
Proposition 1 The complete knowledge of the world is possible.
Proof. Suppose  that  the  complete  description  of  the  world  is  known.  For  any  ϕ∈L either
ϕ∈Cn(d (w)) or  ¬ϕ∈Cn(d (w)) since  d (w) is complete.  By epistemic necessitation and
epistemic distribution (K axiom) the consequences  of known truths are known truths.4 
4 The notion of knowledge used here is not an empirical notion in which computational properties, such as available
memory space and computation time, must be taken into account. To avoid misunderstanding the term "knowledge"
can be replaced by "semantic information" (van Benthem, 2011).
Proposition 2 If knowledge is complete, then a disjunction being known implies a disjunct being
known. 
Proof. Using epistemic modal operator K  the sentence "It is known that ϕ "  can be written
down as Kϕ . Proposition 2 is symbolically noted as (5). 
If K p∨K¬ p for all p∈el(L) , then K(ϕ∨ψ) implies Kϕ∨K ψ for all
ϕ ,ψ∈L . (5)
The proof for the proposition relies on the deductive closure property of knowledge understood as
semantic information, namely, it depends on K axiom by which the consequences of known truths
are known truths. 
Remark 3 The idea on existence of implication from disjunction to at least one of its disjuncts is
not  restricted  to  the  realm  of  complete  knowledge  but  also  appears  in  dialogue  rules  and  in
mathematical  intuitionistic  logic.  Dialogical  reconstruction of logical  intuitions  began with Paul
Lorenzen. Lorenzen's logic of argumentation results in same theorems as intuitionistic logic does
(Krabbe, 2006). Dialogical disjunction is the right of the opponent to seek from the proponent the
justification for one disjunct chosen by the proponent. Such disjunction obviously corresponds to
"effective  disjunction"  of  intuitionistic  logic  and  its  constructive  requirement  that  the  proof  of
disjunction requires the proof of at least one disjunct .
External inconsistency of Tractarian theory with quantum 
theory 
Neither of the here discussed Tractarian postulates withstands the confrontation with the theory of
quantum  mechanics.  If  the  whole  consisting  of  scientific  and  philosophical  knowledge  is
subordinated to the requirement of the external consistency of its parts, as our method assumes, then
revision either of Tractarian or quantum theory is needed, and, by the method accepted in this paper,
it is the former that ought to be revised.
Are states of affairs mutually independent? 
Let us identify some state of affairs with the descriptum of the "basic physical propositions''. Basic
physical propositions have the form  m(e)=r with the meaning  "the magnitude  m  has the
value  r for  the  object  e ".   Here  we  partially  follow  Putnam's  terminology  who  writes
"Statements of the form  m(e)=r  - the magnitude  m  has the value r in the system E -
are the sorts of statements we shall call basic physical propositions...''  (Putnam, 1975:178).  The
descriptum of basic physical proposition is some atomic,  non-conjunctive state of affairs.  Basic
physical  propositions  are  measurement  statements  and  therefore  they  exploit  some  abstract
measuring structure, for example, a numerical structure. In the measurement, some relations of the
measuring structure are used for the description of the measured empirical structure (Suppes and
Zinnes, 1963). Therefore, measurement statements cannot be treated as atomic in the proper sense. 
The basic physical proposition m(e)=r  is not about a relation in the world, it does not describe
an atomic state of affairs consisting of a functional relation  m that connects a physical object
e  to an element  r of the measuring structure. Birkhoff and von Neumann made the similar
point: "how absurd it would be to call an  experimental proposition, the assertion that the angular
momentum ... of the earth around the sun was at a particular instant a rational number''  (Birkhoff
and von Neumann, 1936: 825). An atomic state of affairs is not a relation between elements of the
two structures, empirical and abstract, but the state thus described.
Let us denote by  des (m(e)=r ) the atomic state of affairs that is the  descriptum of (i.e.,  that
which is described by) a basic physical proposition  m(e)=r . Let  Pr (m,e ) be the set of all
propositions describing possible atomic states of affairs with respect to magnitude m  and object
e .  
Examples.   Assuming that position is a primitive magnitude,  the set Pr (position , e) could be
understood as the set of all propositions having the form position(e)=⟨r1 ,r2 , r3⟩ where the set of
triples of real numbers performs the role of the measuring structure.  Assuming that having vertical
polarization  is  a  primitive  magnitude,  the  set Pr (vertical polarisation , e) ,  if  non-empty,  will
contain  exactly  two  propositions,  e.g.,  vertical polarisation(e)=1 and
vertical polarisation(e)=0 .
In order to restate the independence postulate in terms of descripta of physical propositions, some
additional technical terms will have to be introduced. First, let choice function ch be the function
that picks exactly one proposition from any non-empty set Pr (m,e )  for each  m and  e .
Second, denote by c  the set consisting of at most one proposition for each magnitude and each
object, i.e., c={ch(Pr (m ,e)):Pr (m ,e)≠∅  for some m  and e } . Third, enrich the language with
non-primitive or derivative magnitudes f which take the values of primitive magnitude functions
as their arguments,  thus obtaining non-basic propositions of the form  f (m1(e) ,... ,mn(e))=r .
Denote by  Fc the set  of non-basic  propositions  built  over  c  so  that  if  f is  an  n-place
derivative  magnitude  and  m1(e)=r1 ,..., mn(e)=rn are  propositions  in  c ,  then
f (m1(e) ,... ,mn(e))=r is  a  proposition  in  Fc .  Finally,   the  union  of  the  chosen  basic
propositions and their related non-basic propositions c∪Fc gives the description of a "magnitude
world". 
Now the independence postulate (Postulate 1) can be restated as the claim about magnitude world.
Denote by des (c∪Fc)  the set of descripta of propositions in  c∪Fc . The alleged postulate
would be:  Any  des (c∪Fc)  is a world. Surprisingly, by the uncertainty principle, the alleged
postulate fails since there can be no world having exactly one descriptum of a position proposition
and exactly one descriptum of a momentum proposition.
Postulate  5.  For  any  two  descripta of  a  position  proposition  des ( position(e)=r1)  and  a
momentum proposition des (momentum(e)=r2) there is no world that contains them.
Postulate 5 shows that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle allows only for those possible worlds that
are  either  incomplete (gappy  worlds,  lacking  at  least  one  descriptum for  propositions   from
Pr (m,e)  for some m and e ) or overfull (glutty worlds, having either at least two descripta
for  propositions  from  Pr (m,e )  or  a  new type  of  descriptum corresponding  to  at  least  two
propositions from Pr (m,e) for some m and e . On the other hand, application of Postulate
1 to magnitude world requires exactly one descriptum for each magnitude of an object.  Therefore,
there  is  an  external  inconsistency  between  Tractarian  explicit  metaphysics  and  Heisenbergian
implicit metaphysics.  
Is there a unique mode of composition? 
Suppose one wants to save representation relation (picture relation) between the language and the
world in the face of the fact that quantum disjunction is not a truth-function of its disjuncts. 5 If the
5 See the last section of this paper for the discussion on quantum disjunction.
quantum world is gappy, there will be no state of affairs to represent. So, one must turn to glutty
worlds in order to find the representandum of the quantum disjunction.  Denote by des ( p∨Q p ')
the disjunct state of affairs described by quantum disjunction  of  propositions  p and  p'
describing mutually exclusive or orthogonal states.  It should be noted here that orthogonality does
not  mean  alternation  ("...  just  in  case  that  not  ...")  since  for  some magnitudes  the  number  of
orthogonal states of the same object can be infinite, while in classical logic mutual exclusiveness
comes in pairs.6 According to quantum mechanics disjunctive states of affairs are possible: they are
either  tacitly  permitted  as  in  "orthodox  interpretation'',  or  at  least  constitute  the  ontological
commitments of the theory in the realistic interpretation of mathematical representations used by
the quantum mechanics.7 
The disjunctive mode of composition of states of affairs is forbidden by Tractarian postulate of
unique mode of composition (Postulate 2). Quite the opposite holds true in the quantum mechanics:
it allows mutually exclusive states of affairs involving the same object and the same magnitude to
co-exist.8 If the co-existence of orthogonal states is admitted, then a different kind of picture relation
must be introduced to account for possibility of representation of a glutty world. Since complete
worlds of the type des (c∪Fc)  are impossible  by uncertainty  principle  and glutty  worlds are
required in the realistic interpretation of quantum superposition, the concepts of the world and of
the reality function must be accordingly redefined.  In the set-theoretic modeling used in this paper,
this means that for some set Pr (m,e ) of propositions representing possible magnitude values  of
an  object,  a  possible  world  will  have  one  and  the  same  descriptum for  a  set  of  at  least  two
propositions.  Skipping the technical  details,  assume as a simple modeling solution that a glutty
world  wQ  contains  some state  of  affairs  s which  is  an  at  least  two-membered  subset  of
descripta of  magnitude  propositions,  namely,   s⊆{des (p) : p∈Pr (m,e)} and  2≤|s| .
Consequently the reality function must be appropriately redefined, see Definition  5.
Example. The two propositions spin(e)=up and spin(e)=down about the spin of an electron
e describe  mutually  exclusive  states  of  affairs.  The  descriptum of  quantum  disjunctive
proposition will be denoted  here by des (spin(e)=up∨Q spin(e)=down) and given the fact that
disjuncts describe orthogonal state it will represent a disjunctive state of affairs or a superposition of
states in a glutty world. 
Definition 5  real (p∨Qq ,w)=true iff  pPs  or qPs  or ( p∨Qq)Ps  for some s∈wQ ,
and real (p∨Qq ,w)= false otherwise.
6 Compare  the  following  citation  and  interpret  "independent"  as  "both  cannot  be  simultaneously  observed":
"Orthogonality between rays is an important concept for quantum mechanics: orthogonal rays refer to states that are
independent of one another. The different possible position states of a particle are all orthogonal to one another, as
are all possible momentum states. But position states are not orthogonal to momentum states. ... The general rule R
for  a  measurement  (or  observation)  requires  that  the  different  aspects  of  a  quantum  system  that  can  be
simultaneously magnified to the classical level--and between which the system must then choose--must always be
orthogonal'' (Penrose, 1999: 336). 
7 The orthodox or realistic interpretation can be found in this quotation if we take the expression "not anywhere" to
mean "at no particular position but nevertheless somewhere": "Suppose I do measure the position of the particle,
and I find it to be at the point c. Question: Where was the particle just before I made the measurement? ... [...] 2.
The orthodox position: The particle wasn't really anywhere. It was the act of measurement that forced the particle to
take a stand (though how and why it  decided on the point  c we dare  not ask).  [...]  This view (the so-called
Copenhagen interpretation) is associated with Bohr and his followers. Among physicists it has always been the
most widely accepted position'' (Griffiths,  2012:89). 
8 An example from the literature: "In quantum mechanics ...the state of a system is represented by an element in a
complex Hilbert space ... (which is a vector space, equipped with a scalar product, that is complete in the norm
induced by the scalar product). In particular, this means that for any two states (e.g., for a spin-1/2  system, the
states of spin-up and spin-down in direction x), an arbitrary linear combination (or superposition) is also a possible
state: |ϕ ⟩=α|+x ⟩+β|−x ⟩ " (Bacciagaluppi, 2009:52). 
Is the best possible knowledge logically complete? 
In 1935. Schrödinger's formulated the mereological principle of  best possible knowledge: 
Best possible knowledge of a whole does not include best possible knowledge of its parts ...
(Schrödinger, [1935] 1980: 338)
The best possible knowledge is not complete since, inter alia, it is possible that maximal knowledge
of a disjunction does not imply knowledge of any of its disjuncts provided that the disjunction in
question is a quantum one.  Knowledge can be the best possible even if no disjunct of a known
disjunction is known. So, the epistemic situation described by proposition (6) below can occur in
the  best  possible  knowledge  in  Schrödinger's  sense,  reading  KQϕ as  "in  the  best  possible
knowledge in Schrödinger's sense it is known that ϕ ".
KQ( p∨Qq )∧¬KQ p∧¬KQq (6)
The rejection of Tractarian possibility of complete knowledge (Proposition 1) is a corollary of the
theses on the possibility of superposition  and its representation (see Definition 5). 
Suppose that for some glutty world wQ contains the descriptum des ( p∨Q p ')  for propositions
that represent orthogonal states des ( p) and des ( p' ) . The best possible knowledge of  world
wQ  implies  the  absence  of  knowledge  whether   p or  p' hold.  So,  the  best  possible
empirical knowledge is not a complete knowledge: if  a disjunction with propositions describing
orthogonal states is true in a glutty world,  none of its disjuncts can be known.9
Is logic prior to any experience? 
In Tractatus propositions are understood as truth-functions while logic is conceived as a condition
of possibility of any experience of reality. 
5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a
truth-function of itself.)
5.552 [...] Logic is prior to every experience--that something is so.
5.557 [...] ...logic and its application must not overlap. 
(Wittgenstein, [1921] 1974) 
Non-truth functional character of quantum disjunction
The semantic definitions for connectives of the quantum logic can be obtained by taking  " ϕ  is
true" to mean "the vector that represents the system lies within the subspace that represents ϕ "
and by associating each quantum n-ary connective with a function from n subspaces to a subspace
of the high-dimensional complex vector space (Maudlin, 2005). Subspaces can be partially ordered
by inclusion since it is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric relation. Since any non-empty finite
set of subspaces has the lowest upper bound (supremum) and the greatest lower bound (infimum),
the partial  ordering forms a lattice.   In their seminal paper on quantum logic Birkhoff and von
Neumann (1936) identify this ordering relation with the  consequence relation.10  
9 Putnam draws the same conclusion but from different premises: "A system has no complete description in quantum
mechanics; such thing is a logical impossibility, [...]'' (Putnam, 1975:185). 
10 Implication is a partial ordering: "...  the experimental  propositions concerning a system  S  correspond to a
family of subsets of its phase-space Σ , in such a way that "x implies y'' (x and y being any two experimental
propositions)  means  that  the  subset  of  Σ corresponding  to  x is  contained  set-theoretically  in  the  subset
corresponding to y'' (Birkhoff  and von Nemann, 1936: 827). Implication structure forms a lattice: "In any calculus
of propositions, it is natural to imagine that there is a weakest proposition implying, and a strongest proposition
Quantum  conjunction  is  an  easy  case.  It  is  interpreted  as  the  intersection  of  subspaces  and
consequently,  the  logical  behavior  of  the  quantum  conjunction  is  analogous  to  the  classical
conjunction. The hard case is quantum disjunction, which is true iff  the vector that represents the
system lies within the subspace that  represents the disjunctive proposition  ϕ∨Qψ .   In other
words,  the quantum disjunction  is  true iff  the vector  that  represents  the system lies  within the
subspace that is spanned by the subspace that represents the proposition ϕ  and the subspace that
represents  the  proposition  ψ .11  The  logical  behaviour  of  the  quantum  disjunction  is  not
analogous to the classical one. Quantum disjunction is not just the union of the subspaces associated
with the disjuncts but their span. Therefore, it is possible for a disjunction to be true while none of
disjuncts is true.  This fact makes quantum disjunction similar to classical proof-theoretical notion
of disjunction: provability of a disjunction does not imply provability of at least one disjunct. On
the other hand, the quantum disjunction is not similar to the intuitionistic proof-theoretical notion of
disjunction or to the dialogue-logic disjunction. In intuitionistic logic provability of a disjunction
demands provability of at least one disjunct, while in dialogue logic the disjunction stands for the
right of the opponent of the disjunction to seek from the proponent the justification for one disjunct
chosen by the proponent.
Suppose that propositions ϕ  and ψ  are contradictory so that one is observed just in case the
other is not observed. Adopt the realistic interpretation under which it makes sense to claim that the
quantum disjunction ϕ∨Qψ  has a truth-value prior to observation and that it is true.  According
to the semantic  definition,  the vector  V  that  represents the system must lie  in the subspace
‖ϕ∨Qψ‖ .  If  V∉‖ϕ‖∪‖ψ‖ , then ϕ∨Qψ is true although neither  ϕ  nor ψ  is true.
Since, under realistic interpretation, the vector V  represents the system, i.e. the reality, then there
must be some state of affairs s  that is represented by the vector., but s  makes neither ϕ
nor ψ  true since V∉‖ϕ‖∪‖ψ‖ . However, by the initial, supposition if ϕ  is not true, then
ψ  must be true and vice versa. So,  s  makes contradictories true, which is impossible and,
therefore, it does not exist. However, s  is represented by V  and, therefore, must exist. There
are different  ways of avoiding paradox by revising Tractarian postulates.  For example,  one can
revise ontology by allowing disjunctive composition of states of affairs, or revise epistemology and
reject realism, or  revise logic by admitting connectives which are not truth-functional. If we keep
quantum logic and opt for realism regarding the possibility of representing  (the possibility of truth)
of  the  sentence  describing  a  non-observable  states  of  affairs,  then  we are  forced  to  revise  our
ontology and logic.
For the anti-realist the quantum disjunction can be regarded as an "inference ticket" allowing the
deduction from " ϕ∨Qψ  holds" to "the measurement will show that either ϕ  or ψ  is the
case".    On the other  hand,  the realist  must  give  an  account   of  truth-makers  of  the  quantum
disjunction. A disjunctive state of affairs or disjunctive fact can play the role of a truth-maker for
quantum disjunction. Not everybody accepts the disjunctive type of composition of states of affairs
or superposition. The most famous opposition to the ontology of disjunctive states  was expressed in
Schrödinger's  thought  experiment  about  a  cat  that  is  both alive  and dead.  Notwithstanding the
persuasiveness of  Schrödinger's  fable,  the price for rejecting the ontology of disjunctive states
("blurred model") is anti-realism. Beyond the realist vs. anti-realist dispute, the admission of the
quantum disjunction  together  with its  semantics  defined over  high-dimensional  complex vector
space, forces the rejection of the Tractarian logical postulate, namely  that complex sentence is a
truth-function of its constituent parts.
implied by a given pair of propositions" (Birkhoff  and von Nemann, 1936: 827).
11 Denote the subspace that represents proposition ϕ  by ‖ϕ‖ . The subspace ‖ϕ‖ is a set of vectors. The
span  of  two  subspaces  span (‖ϕ‖,‖ψ‖) is  the  set  of  all  linear  combinations  of  their  vectors:
span (‖ϕ‖,‖ψ‖)={x+ y : x∈‖ϕ‖∧ y∈‖ψ‖} .  Finally, ‖ϕ∨Qψ‖=span (‖ϕ‖,‖ψ‖) .
"One can even set up quite ridiculous cases.  A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following device
(which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter, there is a tiny bit of radioactive
substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of the hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability,
perhaps none;  if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a hammer that shatters a small
flask of hydrocyanic acid.  If one has left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if
meanwhile no atom has decayed.  The  Ψ -function of the entire system would express this by having in it the
living and dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts. It is typical of these cases that an
indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic domain becomes transformed into macroscopic indeterminacy, which
can then be resolved by direct observation. That prevents us from so naively accepting as valid a "blurred model'' for
representing reality. In itself, it would not embody anything unclear or contradictory.  There is a difference between a
shaky or out-of-focus photograph and a snapshot of clouds and fog banks." (Schrödinger, [1935] 1980)
Figure 2: The famous  Schrödinger's thought experiment coupled with an illustration for geometrical semantics of 
quantum logic.
Logical pluralism
The maintenance of external consistency between logic and quantum mechanics requires of logic to
take into account empirical considerations. An early account of the new, non-Tractarian conception
of logic was given by Jan Łukasiewicz who famously put the thesis on empirical character of logic
in 1936: 
All a priori systems, as soon as they are applied to reality, become natural-science hypotheses
which  have  to  be  verified  by  facts  in  a  similar  way  as  is  done  with  physical  hypotheses.
(Łukasiewicz, [1936] 1970:233)
The thesis on empirical character of logic seems to be self-evident from the pluralistic standpoint in
philosophy  of  logic:  if  there  is  a  multitude  of  conflicting  logical  systems,  then  some external
criterion  must  be  used  to  decide  which  system  to  use  or,  rather,  to  develop.12 Applying  and
modifying  Łukasiewicz's  thesis  one can arrive at  the following reformulation:  laws of classical
logic, such as distributivity of conjunction over disjunction, as soon as they are applied to the model
of quantum reality, become natural-science hypotheses and share their destiny. 
Two roles of logic in the development of scientific  theory can be differentiated.  First,  a formal
model of some part of reality is built relying on some founding logical theory, e.g., classical logic,
and, second,  the semantics of sentences about that part of reality is defined over its model.  Thus
there are two logics, the one before the model, i.e., the logic used in building it, and the one after
the model,  i.e., the logic of sentences whose meaning is defined over the model.  Quantum logic as
a logic coming after the model becomes an empirical theory if its semantics is defined over the
12 Putnam has  noticed  that  redefinition  of  the  position  of  geometry  within  the  unified  science  provides  a  clear
historical  precedent,  analogous  in  many ways to  repositioning of  logic:  "It  makes  as  much sense  to  speak  of
physical logic as of physical geometry. We live in a world with a non-classical logic'' (Putnam 1975:184). 
model of reality. Thus, the logic after the model is a theory whose claims are refutable on external
grounds. Some of the logical laws, such as distributivity of conjunction over disjunction, may fail
because they do not apply to the model. Putnam's (1975) claim that quantum logic is  the logic is
challenged by the fact of logical pluralism, the logic used in building the model need not be the
same as the logic read-off the model.
Figure 3: A counterexample for distributivity in two-dimensional "geometrical semantics":  the three black lines 
represent propositions ϕ ,ψ ,χ ; the gray arrow V represent the system; the plane represents  proposition
ϕ∨Qψ .  The origin point 0 represents necessarily false proposition  since  zero-dimensional point cannot contain 
any vector.  Proposition χ∧Q (ϕ∨Qψ)  is true since V∈‖χ∧Q(ϕ∨Qψ)‖ . Proposition
(χ∧Qϕ)∨Q (χ∧Qψ)   is false since ‖χ∧Qϕ‖=‖χ∧Qψ‖=0 and ‖(χ∧Q ϕ)∨Q(χ∧Qψ)‖=0 .
Focusing on logic as a theory after the model, the question arises as to whether quantum logic is the
logic of the language of quantum theory. If so, the quantum disjunction would be the disjunction of
quantum theory. If not, then we must allow more than one disjunction-like connective in the logic of
the language of quantum theory.  How many disjunctions do we need for the language of quantum
mechanics? We are inclined to go along with Maudlin's remark that the language of a theory may
use more than one logical term from the same category. 
Using the usual technique for deriving predictions from quantum states, one would say that if
"The particle is at r1  the particle is at r2 '' is true, then an experiment designed to locate
the particle will be certain to "find'' it either at r1  or at r2 , where the "or'' is the classical
disjunction. That is,  the truth of the join of the propositions implies the truth of a classical
disjunction regarding the result of a "measurement''. This is an implication from a proposition
using a quantum connective to a proposition formulated with a classical connective  − it is an
inference that cannot even be formulated if the classical disjunction is unavailable. A fortiori it
cannot  be  an  inference  which  could  in  any  way  suggest  that  the  classical  connective  is
expendable. (Maudlin, 2005:172) 
From the pluralistic standpoint it is acceptable to permit the two disjunction-type operators for the
language of quantum mechanics, both quantum disjunction and classical disjunction. This suggests
a richer notion of logical pluralism: not only (i) logical terms can differ in meaning with respect to
theories or discourses, but also (ii) similar logical terms can have different meaning in the language
of one and the same theory. The language of quantum dynamic logic developed by Baltag and
Smets (2012) can accommodate the varieties of disjunction like operators within the same formal
system. In their approach non-classical features of the quantum behavior are explained by "non-
classical  nature  of  quantum-information-extracting  actions  (quantum tests)''  (Baltag  and Smets,
2012:771). 13
13 This work is based on the talks given in 2013 and 2014 at "Physics and Philosophy" conferences at the University
of Split.  We wish to thank the conferences participants for questions,  comments and criticism, in particular to
Gabriela Bašić, Ljudevit Hanžek, Luca Malatesti, Tim Maudlin, Višnja Maudlin, Franjo Sokolić, Marko Uršič and
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